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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMODITY FUTURES INDUSTRY
IN ORDER TO COMPREHEND THE SELF-REGULATORY FUNCTIONS and obliga-
tions of contract markets under the Commodity Exchange Act1 (CEA
or Act) it is necessary to understand why and how such markets came to
exist. Central markets existed in feudal England. These markets developed
rudimentary trading practices and standards of conduct to regulate them.
Essentially, these early markets were places to engage in spot trans-
actions: cash transactions for immediate delivery. Only agricultural com-
modities were traded in these early markets.
The evolution of this unsophisticated central market into the modern
futures exchange resulted from the changing needs of producers and pro-
cessors of agricultural commodities. Conditions in agricultural markets
were profoundly affected by supply and demand fluctuations in the nine-
teenth century. At times the farmers, the producers, were hurt by over-
* The author dedicates this Article to the memory of Irving C. Nachbar,
member of the New York Bar, 1941-76. The comments and opinions contained
in this Article are those of the author alone and in no way reflect or state any
opinion or comment of ACLI International Commodity Services, Inc.
** B.A., New York University; J.D., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
Cleveland State University. Regulatory Counsel for the ACLI International Com-
modity Services, Inc.
' 7 U.S.C. SS 1-24 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), as amended by the Futures Trading
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294, amending 7 U.S.C.A. SS 4a, 5, 6,
6a, 6c, 6d, 6f-i, 6k, 6m-p, 7a, 8, 9, 12, 12a, 13, 13a-1, 13a-2, 13c, 16a, 18, 20, 21
and 23, enacting 7 U.S.C.A. S 2a, 12d, 25 and 26 (West Supp. 1983).
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1982
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
production which resulted in an over-supply of goods which led the pur-
chasers, the processors, to bid extremely low prices for their requirements.
The farmer, desperate to sell, was forced to accept a low bid for his goods.
On occasion, when the supply of goods far out-stripped the demand of
the processors, it was not uncommon for produce to be dumped or
destroyed.
Conversely, in situations where demand far out-stripped supply, as a
result of a poor harvest, prices for the available crop were bid up by
the processors. In these circumstances, farmers with something to sell
went back to the farm with some cash. The processors who had been
outbid had nothing to process and went home broke.
Clearly there was a need for a mechanism to protect producers and
processors from the vagaries of the marketplace. This need became more
pronounced as American agriculture grew with the opening of the West,
the expansion of the railroads, and the vast European migrations. It
became imperative to produce an effective means of feeding a widely
dispersed and greatly increased population, for the processor and pro-
ducer were needed to help assure a continuous food supply for the grow-
ing nation. To control their risks, farmers and processors developed for-
ward contracting for the delivery of farm products. This involved
agreements to make deliveries at specified times in the future, and at
least assured some merchants and farmers of having sellers and buyers,
respectively.
In 1848 the Chicago Board of Trade was founded. Cash trading and
forward contracting were carried on at this new exchange. As useful as
forward contracting was in finding buyers and sellers, it did nothing to
control financial risk resulting from crop failures, inadequate transporta-
tion and storage facilities, or other circumstances beyond the control of
the parties.
Futures contracts' were developed to control these risks. One method
by which futures contracts are used to control risk is called hedging. The
regulations to the Commodity Exchange Act define bonafide hedging
transactions as
transactions or positions in a contract for future delivery on any
contract market, where such transactions or positions normally
represent a substitute for transactions to be made or positions
to be taken at a later time in a physical marketing channel, and
where they are economically appropriate to the reduction of risks
in the conduct and management of a commercial enterprise, and
where they arise from: (i) the potential change in the value of
assets which a person owns, produces, manufactures, processes,
2 A futures contract is a binding agreement to take delivery of or to deliver
a known quantity of a commodity which is of a uniform quality at a price specified
at the time the contract is made. Delivery is to be at the seller's option and is
to be made at a specified time during a specified delivery month.
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or merchandises or anticipates owning, producing, manufacturing,
processing or merchandising; (ii) the potential change in the value
of liabilities which a person owes or anticipates incurring; or (iii)
the potential change in the value of services which a person pro-
vides, purchases or anticipates providing or purchasing.3
In addition to its hedging function, futures trading serves as a price-
setting mechanism and finally as a potential profit-making vehicle for
speculators. Commodity trading is no longer exclusively agricultural as
in the early years. In fact, items not traditionally thought of as com-
modities have been defined as such by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC or Commission) and are presently approved for trading
on United States commodities exchanges.'
' 17 C.F.R. S 1.3(z) (1982).
' On the Chicago Board of Trade the following commodities have been ap-
proved for trading: corn, oats, soybeans, soybean meal, wheat, gold, iced broilers,
plywood, silver, stud lumber, GNMA mortgages, commercial paper 90 days, long
term T-bonds, GNMA mortgages CD, commercial paper 30 days, T-notes 4 to
6 years, domestic CD's 3 months, long term T-notes 61/z-10 years, short term
T-notes 21-24 months, soybean seeds and Eurodollar time deposit rates 3 months.
On The Chicago Mercantile Exchange the following commodities have been
approved for trading: butter, live cattle, feeder cattle, eggs, frozen pork bellies,
frozen boneless beef, skinned hams, grain sorghums, Russet Burbank potatoes,
live hogs, lumber, turkeys, Canadian dollars, copper, Deutsche marks, Dutch
guilders, French francs, gold, Japanese yen, Mexican pesos, pounds sterling, Swiss
francs, U.S. silver coins, T-bills 90 days, platinum, stud lumber, T-bills 1 year,
T-notes 4 years, fresh broiler chickens, plywood, domestic CD's 3 months, Italian
lira and Eurodollar time deposit rates 3 months.
On the Commodity Exchange, Inc. the following have been approved for trading:
copper, gold, silver, zinc, T-bills 90 days, GNMA and T-notes 2 years.
On the Kansas City Board of Trade the following have been approved for
trading: corn, grain sorghums, wheat and value line average stock index.
On the Midamerica Commodity Exchange the following have been approved
for trading: corn, hogs, oats, soybeans, wheat, gold, silver, U.S. silver coins, live
cattle, T-bonds long term and T-bills 90 days.
On the Minneapolis Grain Exchange the following have been approved for
trading: barley, corn, flaxseed, frozen pork bellies, oats, rye, soybeans, wheat,
Durum wheat and sunflower seeds.
On the New Orleans Commodity Exchange the following have been approved
for trading: milled rice (long grain), rough rice, cotton and soybeans.
On the New York Coffee, Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange the following have been
approved for trading: cocoa (nos. 11 and 12), coffee (B and C) and sugar.
On the New York Cotton Exchange Citrus Association the following have been
approved for trade: cotton (nos. 1 and 2) and frozen concentrated orange juice.
The Petroleum Association approves crude oil and liquid propane for trading.
The Wool Association approves only wool for trading.
The New York Futures Exchange approves the following for trading: foreign
currencies (British pounds, Canadian dollars, Deutsche marks, Japanese yen and
Swiss francs), T-bills 90 days, T-bonds 20 years, bank CD's, GNMA CD and
Eurodollar time deposit rates 3 months.
The New York Mercantile Exchange approves the following for trading: frozen
19821
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By 1982, contract markets had become even more exotic in their trading
vehicles. As more and more nonagricultural commodities were traded in
response to economic needs, volume for such commodities soared.' Finan-
cial instrument pits in Chicago are as hectic as the more traditional bean
pits.
There has been a move away from agricultural commodities to the
various financial instruments. From this it may be stated that as the
economy has changed, futures markets have changed, moving to meet
new demands. This has led to a much greater public participation in
futures trading as more commodities can be traded as hedges by an or-
dinary investor trying to protect himself from large swings in interest
rates or wishing to diversify his investments so that he is not as
vulnerable as he would be if all his investments were in one area. As
noted in a House Committee on Energy and Commerce report in regard
to financial futures, "these derivative instruments have been used to
speculate on and hedge against, not only price changes in the specific
underlying instruments, but also changes in interest rates generally. The
financial futures market has emerged in a few short years as a critical
adjunct to the cash market."6
The modern commodity exchange has grown and changed with the
times. Today such exchanges are the centers of some of the most highly
specialized computer terminals in the financial world. Yet, in the midst
of all this sophisticated electronic equipment, orders to buy and sell billions
boneless beef, round white potatoes, Belgian francs, British pounds, Canadian
dollars, Deutsche marks, Dutch guilders, kilo gold, heating oil, industrial fuel oil,
Italian lira, Japanese yen, Mexican pesos, Swiss francs, palladium, platinum, but-
ter, industrial fuel oil (U.S. delivery), heating oil (U.S. delivery), Gulf coast no.
2 heating oil, N.Y. harbor leaded regular gasoline, N.Y. harbor unleaded regular
gasoline, Gulf coast leaded regular gasoline and Gulf coast unleaded regular
gasoline.
S. REP. No. 384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 180-82 Appendix B (1982).
' In 1980-81, the volume of trading on exchanges expanded greatly from
1979-80. In thousand contracts, the volume of trade at the Chicago Board of Trade
increased from 38,433.6 in 1979-80 to 57,474.1 in 1980-81. Similarly, on the
Midamerica Commodity Exchange, trade increased in thousand contracts from
2,584.9 to 3,086.4. Even the Kansas City Board of Trade registered an increase
from 1,201.5 to 1,204.5 thousand contracts. Although the Minneapolis Grain Ex-
change registered a decrease in 1980-81, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and
the International Monetary Market enjoyed an increase from 21,308.0 in 1979-80
to 23,748.1 thousand contracts in 1980-81. There was a dramatic increase in trade
volume at the New York Mercantile Exchange from 905.8 in 1979-80 to 1,726.9
thousand contracts in 1980-81. There were trading volume decreases at the New
York Cotton Exchange and Associates and the Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange,
but the Commodity Exchange, Inc. experienced a trade volume increase from
10,300.5 in 1979-80 to 13,328.5 in 1980-81 as did the New York Futures Exchange
from 66.1 to 378.0 thousand contracts. S. REP. No. 384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 182-86
Appendix C (1982).
6 H.R. REP. No. 565, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 2, at 5 (1982).
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of dollars worth of commodities each year are executed manually through
a system of bids and offers made openly at a ring or pit.! The exchanges
are policed via a system of self-regulation.
I Senate U.C. Bill 2109, the 1982 reauthorization of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, included the following explanation of the mechanics of com-
modities futures trading:
Placing Orders
The customer contacts a solicitor or account executive who in turn
transmits the order either directly or through a central office, to the
exchange trading floor. The order is received on the trading floor by
the firm's phone man. After recording and timestamping the order, he
gives it to a runner who carries the order to a floor broker in the
designated areas for that commodity. These trading areas are called pits
or rings and each delivery month of a commodity is generally traded
in a certain area of that pit or ring. Some firms no longer telephone
orders to the floor. Instead, the orders are fed through a computerized
system that transmits them to the floor via teletype.
Execution of Trades
The actual trading of futures contracts takes place in the noisy boisterous
setting of an auction-type market. The Commodity Exchange Act requires
that all futures transactions be executed on a commodity exchange
designated as a "contract market." Both the Commodity Exchange Act
and the rules and regulations of the commodity exchange require that
futures transactions be executed openly in a competitive manner. Sec-
tion 1.38 of the regulations under the Commodity Exchange Act reads
in part as follows:
"All purchases and sales of any commodity for future delivery on or sub-
ject to the rules of a contract market shall be executed openly and com-
petitively by open outcry or posting of bids and offers or by other equally
open and competitive methods, in the trading pit or ring or similar place
provided by the contract market, during the regular hours prescribed
by the contract market for the trading in such commodity."
Certain carefully prescribed exceptions to competitive trading are
allowed, but they do not nullify the general requirement of open and
competitive trading.
The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that all trades are executed
at competitive prices and that all trades are focused into the centralized
market place to participate in the competitive determination of the price
of futures contracts. This system also provides ready access to the market
for all orders and results in a continuous flow of price information to
the public.
The rules requiring competitive trading also require that all trades be
executed in the area and during the hours designated by the contract
market. Other exchanges can trade virtually identical contracts for the
same commodity, provided they meet the requirements of a contract
market as specified by the Commodity Exchange Act and are so
designated by the Commission.
Clearing Trades
After a trade has been executed, the confirmation of the trade retraces
the path of the initial order within a few minutes. Final confirmation,
however, cannot be made until the trade goes through the clearing house.
In the clearing house, both sides of the trade must be matched, and any
1982]
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It must be noted that self-regulation under the Commodity Exchange
Act is aimed to a great extent at assuring that the system of "open out-
cry" bids and offers is carried out in a manner which assures that all
orders are entered at the ring and executed fairly, so that every public
customer is certain of getting the best possible price for his order. To
be more succinct, the purpose of self-regulation is to protect the integrity
of the marketplace. An exchange which does not assure the public
customer of a fair deal will suffer a large number of dormant contracts.
The self-regulation of this trading process by the several commodity
differences between the buyer and seller must be referred to the clear-
ing firms involved for reconciliation. The clearing procedure for futures
trading points out one of the major distinctions between futures and
securities trading. Unlike securities, there is no certificate or document
exchanged in a futures transaction. The futures contract is embodied
in the rules and regulations of the contract market. The clearing house
(or clearing association) performs the functions of matching all buys and
sells which are executed each day and of assuring the financial integrity
of all futures transactions. As trades are matched and confirmed at the
end of each trading session, the clearing house takes the opposite side
of every transaction. It becomes the seller of all "buys" and the buyer
of all "sells." Thus, when a trader establishes a position in the market,
he does so with the clearing house, and when he offsets his position he
offsets it with the clearing house. The clearing house assumes the legal
responsibility for the opposite side of every transaction made on the con-
tract market.
The clearing house requires that its members deposit margins to secure
their firm's futures transactions. The clearing members in turn require
margins from their customers. If the market moves against the open
contracts of a clearing firm, that firm's initial margin is impaired and
additional margin will be required.
Daily payments or receipts also occur between the clearing house and
its members to account for daily price changes. The clearing house main-
tains the open accounts of member firms at the current market prices.
At the end of each day, these accounts are adjusted to the day's settle-
ment price for each contract. Firms with net gains receive payment from
the clearing house, while firms with net losses make payments to the
clearing house. The receipts and payment of the clearing house exactly
offset one another, with the clearing house merely transferring equity
from losers to winners.
Deliveries
Deliveries on futures contracts are also made through the clearing house.
A seller wishing to make delivery on a futures contract during the
delivery month files a delivery notice with the clearing house on the
day prior to the intended delivery. The clearing house then assigns the
notice to clearing members having long positions in the particular future.
Assignment of the delivery notice is generally to the clearing member
having the oldest long position, although some exchanges allocate the
assignments to other bases. At this point, the clearing house has com-
pleted its role, and the delivery must be consummated between the buyer
and seller in accordance with exchange rules.
S. REP. No. 384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 187-88 Appendix D (1982).
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exchanges is complicated not only by the new vehicles being offered for
trading but also by the vast increases in the market itself. But, even with
this rapid expansion of the industry, the exchanges have maintained effi-
cient enforcement departments in keeping with the requirements of the
Act.
II. CONTRACT MARKET SELF-REGULATION
The obligation of contract markets to regulate themselves is contained
in various sections of the Act and the accompanying CFTC regulations
and guidelines.' Section 5a(8) of the Act9 must be reviewed to properly
analyze this obligation of self-regulation. This section sets forth what is
required of a commodity exchange to regulate itself. It states that each
contract market shall:
(8) enforce all bylaws, rules, regulations, and resolutions, made
or issued by it or by the governing board thereof or any commit-
tee, that (i) have been approved by the Commission pursuant to
paragraph (12) of this section, (ii) have become effective under such
paragraph, or (iii) must be enforced pursuant to any Commission
rule, regulation, or order; and revoke and not enforce any bylaw,
rule, regulation, or resolution, made, issued, or proposed by it or
by the governing board thereof or any committee, that has been
disapproved by the Commission; .... "
In order to effectuate this section of the Act, the CFTC, pursuant to
its authority granted by section 8A(5)," enacted certain regulations. For
example, regulation section 1.51 entitled Contract Market Program for
Enforcement 2 sets forth what an exchange must do in order to comply
with the provisions of the Act. This section calls for an affirmative action
program to be exercised with due diligence in order to assure compliance
with sections 5, 5a, 5b, 6(a), 6b, 8(a)(7), 8(a)(9) and 8(c) of the Act.' 3 More
specifically, regulation 1.51 states that an enforcement program is to
include:
(1) Surveillance of market activity for indications of possible con-
gestion or other market situations conducive to possible price
distortion;
' 7 U.S.C. S 7a (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 17 C.F.R. S 1.51 (1982); Contract Market
Rule Enforcement Program, Guideline No. 2, 1 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 6430
(1982).
7 U.S.C. S 7a(8) (1976).
" Id., as amended by Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat.
2294 (1983).
" 7 U.S.C. S 4a(j) (1976).
" 17 C.F.R. S 1.51 (1981).
13 7 U.S.C. SS 7, 7a, 7b, 8, 9, 10a(9), 10c, 12a(7), 12a(9), 12c (1976 and Supp. V. 1981).
1982]
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(2) Surveillance of trading practices on the floor of such contract
market;
(3) Examination of the books and records kept by contract market
members relating to their business of dealing in commodity
futures, commodity options, and cash commodities, insofar as such
business relates to their dealing on such contract market;
(4) Investigation of complaints received from customers or options
customers concerning the handling of their accounts or orders;
(5) Investigation of all other alleged or apparent violation of such
by-laws, rules, regulations and resolutions;
(6) Such other surveillance, record examination and investigation
as is necessary to enforce such by-laws, rules, regulations and
resolutions; and
(7) A procedure which results in the taking of prompt, effective
disciplinary action for any violation which is found to have been
committed."
In addition, the regulation provides that exchanges keep full, complete
and accurate records of their disciplinary processes. 5 To further clarify
the preceding requirements the CFTC issued Guideline 2.'" These three
elements form the basis of an exchange's self-regulatory obligations under
the Act and will be discussed further in succeeding Sections of this Article.
III. EXCHANGE DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE
As previously noted, regulation section 1.51'" requires that an exchange
establish a disciplinary mechanism to take action against its members
for rule violations. Part 8 of the regulations was adopted by the Commis-
sion to provide standards for the contract markets to follow in the
establishment of a disciplinary process that would comply with the re-
quirements of the Act.18
Each of the active commodity exchanges in the United States has
prepared rules, regulations and by-laws to govern trade practices: the
actual trading on the floor of the exchange. The rules provide the
framework for an exchange's brokers to work within, from the actual entry
of an order to its execution in a trading pit or ring and then the report
back to the customer. The rules, regulations and by-laws prohibit a broker
from trading ahead of his customer,'9 improperly crossing trades,' mak-
17 C.F.R. S 1.51(a)(I)-(6) (1982).
'Id. S 1.51(a)(7).
16 Contract Market Rule Enforcement Program, Guideline No. 2, 1 COMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 6430 (1982).
17 C.F.R. S 1.51(7) (1982).
1 Id. 5 8.01.
1 Id. 5 155.2.
Id. 5 1.39.
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ing improper or disruptive bids or offers," fictitious transactions," wash
trades23 and bucketing,24 among others. In addition to specific prohibited
conduct, broader rules have been enacted by the exchanges which make
it an offense, subject to disciplinary action, to engage in conduct detrimen-
tal to the best interests of the exchange or to engage in conduct inconsis-
tent with just and equitable principles of trade.2 5
As previously noted, the CFTC issued Guideline 226 to advise contract
markets of exactly what is expected of them in their enforcement ac-
tivities. Guideline 2 explains that the "due diligence" required in regula-
tion 1.51 is to be determined on an individual case by case basis using
all the circumstances of the situation in question as factors to be con-
sidered in determining if "due diligence" has been exercised.27 This means
that an exchange must establish procedures to carry out its enforcement
program that are set and uniform as well as flexible enough to adapt
to the varied situations which occur in the course of trading on an
exchange.
Realizing that no contract market enforcement program can be airtight,
the Commission has stated that it does not expect all instances of rule
violations to be detected but that it does expect compliance programs
to be reasonably calculated to enforce exchange rules.2" It is thus man-
datory that a reasonable program exist. Guideline 2 sets forth that the
excuse of insufficient financial resources to fund an adequate enforcement
program is completely unacceptable.' As a consequence, the Commission
permits an exchange to hire non-exchange employees for surveillance and
enforcement duties. Guideline 2 provides, however, that an exchange can-
not escape responsibility for inadequate surveillance and enforcement
where such activities were contracted out to non-employees. Moreover,
the Commission has explicitly directed that all contract personnel must
come under the control of the exchange at all times."0
The order for a continuing affirmative action program of rule enforce-
ment has resulted in exchanges' establishing complex schedules for trading
21 Id. S 1.38.
7 U.S.C. S 6c(a)(A) (1976).
23 Id.
2' Id. S 6(b)(D).
? CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE RULES 500 and 504 (1981); CHICAGO MERCANTILE
EXCHANGE RULE 432(q) (1979); COMMODITY EXCHANGE, INC. BY-LAW S 210(a)(vi),
(vii) (1975); MINNEAPOLIS GRAIN EXCHANGE RULE 801(d) (1979); NEW YORK COT-
TON EXCHANGE RULE 9.01(c)(d) (1981); NEW YORK FUTURES EXCHANGE RULE
501(iv) (1980); NEW YORK MERCANTILE EXCHANGE RULE 57.01(e)-(f) (1980).
26 Contract Market Rule Enforcement Program, supra note 8.
2 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
19821
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floor surveillance, as well as regular reviews of computer records to in-
vestigate members' trading practices and financial conditions. These ac-
tivities are calculated to discover rule violations and to prevent them
where possible.
This surveillance and enforcement activity stems from the requirements
of regulation section 1.51." Guideline 2 describes some of the activities
for which an adequate enforcement program is expected to provide
surveillance. Guideline 2 includes:
(1) Price movements;
(2) Changes in price relationships-among futures, between mar-
kets, futures vs. cash;
(3) Open interest and changes in open interest;
(4) Concentration of positions among clearing members;
(5) Volume of trading and changes therein;
(6) Trading liquidity and the magnitude of successive price
changes;
(7) Deliverable supplies;
(8) Deliveries -is there any apparent concentration in the making
or taking of deliveries?
(9) Market news and gossip.2
These Guideline 2 requirements have led exchanges to create specific
computer programs to investigate and detect abnormalities of trading.
Each computer program which is created to assist market surveillance
produces additional specialized trading records. These records must be
maintained for a period of five years' and have become a part of self-
regulation by record-making and retention.
Market news and gossip are recognized as factors that will move a
market as surely as supply and demand and very often much more
dramatically. News service tickers are maintained on exchange trading
floors to disseminate what is hoped to be accurate information about
national and international events. In the agricultural commodities area,
for instance, information may be as varied as reports of a Russian grain
failure, a forecasting of a bumper grain crop for American farmers or
a United States Weather Service prediction of a longer and colder winter
than usual. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the marketplace to ex-
ternal events, great emphasis is placed upon the detection and preven-
tion of rumors before they affect the marketplace.
While computer-assisted trading analysis is important, so too is actual
physical observation of trading in the pits or rings. Guideline 2 provides
that the purpose of this activity "is to deter or eliminate practices which
tend to lessen the competitiveness of floor trading or by which member
31 17 C.F.R. S 1.51 (1982).
" Contract Market Rule Enforcement Program, supra note 8, at 6211.
17 C.F.R. S 1.31(a)(1) (1982).
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floor brokers or futures commission merchants take advantage of
customers. ' 'u
These observations of trading activities are carried out at various times
during each business day, including every opening and closing period of
every commodity traded on any contract market. The openings and clos-
ings are extremely sensitive trading periods. Surveillance of them is
crucial to a proper enforcement program under the Act.
To the uninitiated, the observation of a trading pit may strike up im-
ages of choas. However, to a trained observer who knows what to listen
for, how to read the hand signs which are a trader's shorthand, and what
actions to look for while keeping an eye on the electronic price reporting
board, there is a form of orderliness that makes such personal surveillance
useful in a regulatory scheme. As previously indicated, personal
surveillance and review of trade registers or computer-generated
documents come together in a twofold activity. Guideline 2 notes this and
describes what the surveillance activity should be attempting to discover.
These activities are:
(1) Any floor broker or futures commission merchant taking the
opposite side of customers' orders in a manner in violation
of the exchange rules, whether directly, via an accommodation
trade, or as a customer of the opposite broker.
(2) Any floor broker or futures commission merchant matching
customers' orders in violation of the exchange rules, whether
directly or through the medium of an accommodation trade.
(3) Wash trading by any clearing member or floor trader.
(4) "Holdouts," "unmatched" or "unsigned" trades being im-
properly handled, that is, whether any broker is taking such
trades into his own account or whether such trades are ending
up with a person other than the one with whom such trades
actually were made.
(5) Any trading outside the daily price range.
(6) Any indication of noncompetitive practices such as:
(a) Prearranged trading
(b) Preferential trading
(c) Unusually heavy trading involving two or more
associated brokers.
(7) If the exchange has speculative trading limits -evidence that
any floor trader is trading in excess of such limits . . .
... Examinations should be made to determine whether there
is any indication of floor brokers trading ahead of customers'
orders or failing to give customers' the proper executions of
their orders.'
u Contract Market Rule Enforcement Program, supra note 8, at 6211.
35 Id.
19821
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Guideline 2 also makes general statements concerning the investiga-
tion of customer complaints,36 the investigation of other alleged or ap-
parent violations37 and other surveillance matters.'
Guideline 2 does not attempt to describe all types of surveillance which
exchanges must undertake to enforce their rules in an appropriate manner.
It does grant exchanges the discretion to carry out any surveillance, record
examination or investigation which they determine to be necessary for
an effective enforcement program. Guideline 2 takes note of the fact that
as the exchanges gain experience in enforcing their rules they will be
able to adapt to novel situations with new surveillance programs as
necessary. 9 Conversely, it is possible that as exchanges gain experience,
some programs will become unnecessary or obsolete and will be eliminated
from an enforcement program.
Section 7 of Guideline 2 calls for a prompt and effective disciplinary
and/or corrective procedure." Part 8 of the regulations provides for due
process and fairness in exchange disciplinary proceedings.41
IV. DUE PROCESS IN EXCHANGE DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
To attempt an exact definition of due process is to attempt to catch
mercury with one's bare hands. It will always slip away. At best what
can be defined is the spirit of due process. In an administrative proceeding
such as an exchange disciplinary action, a property right is at stake, not
life or liberty. It has been stated that in an administrative proceeding
there is no particular form of procedure required to constitute due
process."
What then is due process? In a general sense, due process is a "sum-
marized constitutional guarantee of respect for those personal immunities
which . . . are 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience . . . as to be
ranked as fundamental' . . . or are 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.' ,,43
In an administrative proceeding, "it is sufficient for due process if the
party affected is apprised of the nature of the hearing and afforded an
opportunity to offer evidence and examine the opposition."" In even
36 Id. at 6212.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 6213.
39 Id.
40 Id.
" 17 C.F.R. SS 8.01-.28 (1982).
42 FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265, 275 (1949).
4' Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) quoting respectively, Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937).
" Ashbury Truck Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 52 F.2d 263, 268 (S.D. Colo. 1931),
affd, 287 U.S. 570 (1932).
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stronger language, notice and the opportunity for a hearing are essential
to due process where a person's liberty or property rights are affected.'5
The hearing must be full and fair. This means an opportunity to be
present at a set time and place, to offer evidence on one's behalf, to cross
examine any opposing witnesses, to be represented by counsel, to make
a statement summarizing the defense position and to have this procedure
take place before an impartial officer, board or other panel.' The impar-
tial officer, board or panel must render its decision based upon sufficient
evidence." The decision must be founded on reason. It may not be ar-
bitrary. The contesting parties are entitled to know the facts relied upon
in deciding the case.'" In its essence, an exchange disciplinary proceeding
must assure adherence to the fundamental principles of justice and fair
play.49 Through the following analysis of Part 8 of the regulations' it will
be demonstrated that fundamental fairness has been adhered to and the
protections of due process have been extended to members by the com-
modities exchanges.
The regulations which comprise Part 851 flow directly from the regula-
tion section 1.51 requirement for prompt and effective disciplinary
actions.5" Guideline 2 of the CFTC explains the regulation section 1.51
requirements by indicating that disciplinary procedures should provide
that:
(1) The findings are supported by the evidence,
(2) the action is taken with reasonable dispatch, and
(3) in cases where penalties are warranted, that the sanctions
imposed are sufficient to deter future violations.'
In addition to these requirements, Guideline 2 requires that notice of all
actions taken be publicized to further the general deterrent effect.'
Part 8 is a code of regulatory procedure by which a contract market
is to fulfill its obligations under regulation section 1.51. It should be noted
" Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Plato v. Roudebush, 397 F. Supp.
1295 (D. Md. 1975).
6 Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,
339 U.S. 33, modified, 339 U.S. 908 (1950); Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321
U.S. 233 (1944); Philadelphia Co. v. S.E.C., 175 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir.), vacated on
other grounds, 337 U.S. 901 (1949); Jeffries v. Olesen, 121 F. Supp. 463 (S.D. Cal.
1954).
' Amour Transp. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Utility Comm'n, 138 Pa. Super.
243, 10 A.2d 86 (1939).
'8 Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
'9 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, reh'g denied, 364 U.S. 855 (1960).
17 C.F.R. SS 8.01-.28 (1982).
51 Id.
52 17 C.F.R. S 1.51(a)(7) (1982).
' Contract Market Enforcement Program, supra note 8, at 6213.
54 Id.
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that when the CFTC proposes new regulations and when it publishes its
final regulation, the Commission will publish an accompanying preamble
which is, in effect, a CFTC policy statement. This policy statement traces
the new regulation back to its proposal stage and comments as to why
the final rule is in its particular form. Essentially, these comments form
a rule-making history and an analysis of the philosophy behind each rule.
Subpart A of Part 81 sets forth the general scope of the rules. Regula-
tion section 8.031 contains definitions which are pertinent to other provi-
sions of Part 8. Of significance in this definition section is subsection (j),
"Persons within the jurisdiction of the exchange.""7 This subsection ef-
fectively states whom the exchanges are expected to regulate. Jurisdiction
under this section extends to
any exchange employee, staff member or official, any member or
person with membership privileges or any person employed by
or affiliated with a member or person with membership privileges,
including any agent or associated person, any other person under
the supervision or control of the exchange or of any other
member.'
Subpart B of Part 8, entitled Disciplinary Procedure, 9 sets forth the ac-
tions an exchange must take in the interests of due process in its self-
regulatory process.
Regulation section 8.05 states that each exchange is to have adequate
enforcement staff to initiate and conduct investigations and to prosecute
effectively alleged rule violations." As noted previously, the CFTC has
stated that a lack of financial resources for an adequate enforcement pro-
gram is not justification for not having such an enforcement program.
Guideline 2 states simply that such an exchange must modify its finan-
cial arrangements to provide an enforcement program that protects the
public."
Regulation section 8.06, entitled Investigations, requires that the
disciplinary procedures established by the exchanges in conjunction with
their enforcement staffs be such that an investigation will be undertaken
upon a referral from CFTC or upon receipt of information by the exchange
which indicates "a possible basis for finding that a violation has occurred
or will occur."6 The CFTC in its statement of purpose explains that the
broad language of the regulation is intended to include every source of
17 C.F.R. SS 8.01-.03 (1982).
- Id. S 8.03.
51 Id. 5 8.03(j).
58 Id.
Id. SS 8.05-.20.
Id. S 8.05.
" Contract Market Rule Enforcement Program, supra note 8, at 6210.
62 17 C.F.R. S 8.06 (1982).
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information that may suggest the possibility of a rule violation. Therefore,
the CFTC states that an investigation will be required upon receipt of
a complaint from a customer, exchange member or other person."
Regulation section 8.06(b) states that an enforcement staff shall com-
plete an investigation within four months unless a significant reason ex-
ists to extend this time. 4 Just what is to be a "significant reason" is not
set forth. The four month time period meets the requirement of due pro-
cess that a proceeding shall take place within a reasonable period of time.
Based upon the CFTC remarks, it appears that this four month period
is to be used as a standard upon which an enforcement staff's perfor-
mance will be judged." That is, if an exchange shows a significant number
of investigations lasting longer than four months, it may be reasonable
to conclude that the enforcement staff is not properly discharging its
duties and may prompt CFTC proceedings against the exchange for not
properly meeting its obligations under the Commodity Exchange Act. In
addition to this form of liability, it appears that an enforcement staff's
performance may be an area of interest in a civil suit brought against
an exchange pursuant to a private right of action under the Act.6
Section 8.07 is entitled Investigation Reports.17 It is concerned with
the substance of every investigation. As due process calls for a determin-
ing body to be aware of the facts of a disciplinary proceeding when it
decides any aspect of a case, this section provides for that which must
be presented to a disciplinary committee so it may act from an informed
position.
A report is to be made of every investigation. It is to include the reason
an investigation was initiated, a summary of a customer complaint if per-
tinent, any relevant facts and the staffs conclusion and recommendation
as to whether the disciplinary committee should proceed with the matter.'
An investigation report must be prepared even if there is no reasonable
basis upon which to find a violation. If this is the case, the matter may
be dismissed or terminated or the staff may recommend that a warning
letter be issued.6
9
63 [1977-80 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,668, at 22,717-24.
The following is a list of rules of several of the active commodity exchanges which
relate to investigations and the staff authority to conduct them: CHICAGO BOARD
OF TRADE RULE 170.01 (1981), CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCHANGE RULE 401 (1979),
COMMODITY EXCHANGE, INC. NEW RULES 8.21 (1981), KANSAS CITY BOARD OF
TRADE RULE 1400.00 (1981), MINNEAPOLIS GRAIN EXCHANGE RULE 803 (1979), NEW
YORK COTTON EXCHANGE RULE 10.04 (1981), NEW YORK FUTURES EXCHANGE RULE
503 (1980), NEW YORK MERCANTILE EXCHANGE RULE 59.04 (1980).
17 C.F.R. S 8.06(b) (1982).
65 [1977-80 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,668, at 22,726.
" Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir.
1980), aff'd, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 141-46.
67 17 C.F.R. S 8.07 (1982).
6 Id. § 8.07(a).
69 Id. 8.07(b).
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The warning letter in this instance is an interesting device. It may be
issued by the staff if the exchange's rules so permit. It is hoped to have
the effect of deterring future violations and may be used in situations
where a strong suspicion of a rule violation exists but where the staff
lacks the evidence to prove a violation. 0
The CFTC stated in its comments that an investigation report will serve
two purposes. First, it "will provide the disciplinary committee with basis
upon which to decide whether to issue charges of a violation. Second,
it will serve as a record of the investigation and resultant conclusions
by the enforcement staff which may be examined by the Commission dur-
ing its periodic inspections of the exchange's rule enforcement
procedures.'71 It is apparent from this and other Commission statements
that a great deal of what is required of exchanges is done to expedite
the CFTC's oversight obligations and capabilities.
Regulation section 8.08, entitled Disciplinary Committee, states that
exchanges shall establish one or more disciplinary committees to deter-
mine whether violations have been committed, to accept offers of settle-
ment and to set penalties upon a determination of guilt."2 In a bifurcated
committee plan the first committee may be loosely analogized to a grand
jury in that the committee acts as an accusatory body. The second com-
mittee may be seen as a petit jury hearing the merits of the case and
determining guilt or innocence.7
3
The CFTC prohibits any enforcement staff member from serving on
a disciplinary committee. 7' The enforcement staff may have its own counsel
to present cases to the committee. The committee itself may have the
services of other exchange employees, as counsel or otherwise, who may
assist or advise the committee in matters of procedure or logistics, but
will not have any part whatsoever in any deliberative proceeding. As a
practical matter, it is useful for an exchange to provide a committee with
counsel to advise it of its obligations. This should protect the rights of
any participant in a disciplinary matter by preventing a committee from
trampling an individual's due process and fair dealing guarantees. This
71 Id. S 8.07(c).
71 [1977-80 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,668, at 22,727.
72 17 C.F.R. S 8.08 (1982).
" Most commodity exchanges have organized their disciplinary committees
into a bifurcated structure. See, e.g., CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE RULES 540(A) and
542 (1981), COMMODITY EXCHANGE, INC. NEW RULES 8.22 and 8.24 (1980),
MIDAMERICA COMMODITY EXCHANGE RULES 706 and 707 (1978), MINNEAPOLIS
GRAIN EXCHANGE RULE 804 (1979), NEW YORK COFFEE, SUGAR & COCOA Ex-
CHANGE RULES 515 and 518 (1980), NEW YORK COTTON EXCHANGE RULE 10.05(1981), and NEW YORK MERCANTILE EXCHANGE RULE 59.05 (1980). Some commodi-
ty exchanges operate with a single disciplinary committee with combined func-
tions. See, e.g., NEW YORK EXCHANGE RULES 502 and 508 (1980).
7, [1977-80 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,668, at 22,728.
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is an internal policy decision for each exchange to make based upon its
own needs.
Regulation section 8.09, entitled Review of Investigation Report," sets
forth what actions a disciplinary committee should take in regard to the
report submitted to it. First, the committee must make a prompt review
of the report. Such a review will guarantee a prompt disposition of the
matter and will protect the rights of the respondent by not subjecting
him to a needless delay. It is basic to due process that a prompt hearing
be afforded a respondent."' Contract markets would be well advised to
attempt to handle their disciplinary cases in a timely manner. Respondents
would, on the other hand, be well advised to note that the lack of a speedy
hearing is a sound due process defense.
A review of the investigation report may result in one of three disposi-
tions. First, the committee may send the matter back to the enforcement
staff with directions to investigate further. Second, the investigation
report is acceptable for review, and if the committee determines that "no
reasonable basis exists for finding a violation or that prosecution is other-
wise unwarranted, it may direct that no action be taken."7 This may be
done even if it is contrary to the recommendation of the enforcement
staff. Third, upon review the committee may find "that a reasonable basis
exists for finding a violation which should be adjudicated."78 If this is the
case the committee must direct that the person to be charged be served
with a written notice of charges. A formal, written notice of charges is
a fundamental element of the regulatory process and is basic to the pro-
tection of the respondent's right to a fair adjudication. It is an element
of due process that the accused have notice of the charge against him,79
and only then may he properly defend himself. The committee may deter-
mine that the investigation report warrants charges even though the en-
forcement staff has recommended against such action. The integrity of
the accusatory body is preserved by permitting it the independence to
act contrary to any staff recommendation. This frees the committee from
defense charges that it was improperly and unduly influenced by the ex-
change staff. The entire disciplinary process benefits from this
independence.
Regulation 8.10, entitled Predetermined Penalties,' provides that an
exchange may set forth specific maximum penalties for particular viola-
tions. The CFTC points out that predetermined penalties are designed
to expedite the self-regulatory process and it is entirely within the discre-
tion of the exchange to establish appropriate penalties.8
17 C.F.R. S 8.09 (1982).
78 Id. 8.09(b).
78 Id. § 8.09(a).
7Id. §8.09(b).
79 Id.
81 Id. R8.10.
"1 [1977-80 Transfer Binder] Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,668, at 22,729.
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Regulation section 8.11 is entitled Notice of Charges.' The CFTC states
that "it is a fundamental right of a respondent to know which rules he
is charged with violating."83 The regulation states that the notice of
charges is to:
(a) State the acts, practices, or conduct in which the person is
alleged to have engaged;
(b) State the rule alleged to have been violated (or about to be
violated);
(c) State the predetermined penalty, if any;
(d) Prescribe the period within which a hearing on the charges
may be requested;
(e) Advise the person charged that:
(1) He is entitled, upon request, to a hearing on the
charges;
(2) If the rules of the exchange so provide, failure to
request a hearing within the period prescribed in
the notice, except for good cause, shall be deemed
a waiver of the right to a hearing; and
(3) If the rules of the exchange so provide, failure in
an answer to deny expressly a charge shall be
deemed to be an admission of such charge.
8 4
During the public comment process regarding charges, the CFTC stated
that an objection to specific charges was made by an exchange which
noted that a respondent was sometimes charged with conduct detrimen-
tal to the best interests of the exchange or conduct which was inconsis-
tent with just and equitable principles of trade. The CFTC responded
that an exchange may enforce general standards of professional conduct
and practices.' The use of this type of charge was challenged in Crim-
mins v. American Stock Exchange, Inc.86
In this case, the American Stock Exchange (Amex) brought a
disciplinary action against Crimmins, a registered representative, for con-
duct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade and for con-
duct detrimental to the interest and welfare of the Amex. The charges
related to Crimmins' activities in the sale of stock in Four Seasons Nurs-
ing Homes. They concerned an alleged conflict of interest between Crim-
mins and his customers due to his relationship with the principals of Four
Seasons. The charges also alleged that Crimmins made a material misstate-
ment as to his relationship with Four Seasons and engaged in off the
board transactions in a listed security that were against Amex rules. Crim-
17 C.F.R. S 8.11 (1982).
[1977-80 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,668, at 22,729.
17 C.F.R. S 8.11(a)-(e)(3) (1982).
' [1977-80 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,668, at 22,729.
" 368 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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mins, in his action to overturn the Amex disciplinary proceeding, claimed
he had received inadequate notice of the charges against him, that an
unconstitutionally vague standard had been applied in judging his actions
and the penalty which suspended him from the securities industry was
a deprivation of property without due process. The court found the charges
to be more than sufficiently clear and detailed to permit an effective
defense. It found that the Amex Report of Investigation discussed the
conduct upon which Crimmins was charged and gave a clear, detailed
description of the charges. The court also found that he had not been
deprived of a property right without due process and stated that
throughout the disciplinary process he had been represented by counsel
and had the right to subpoena evidence to be used in his defense. As
to the defense of vagueness of the charges the court held, in a part of
the decision that may be of the most interest in an analogy to regulation
section 8.11, that as "an experienced registered representative plaintiff
may be fairly charged with knowledge of ethical standards of his profes-
sion .... "'
Thus, while the CFTC states that exchanges which desire to enforce
professional standards should adopt rules setting those standards, in view
of Crimmins, such action may not be necessary. Arguably, it should be
found that a commodities broker or trader will be held to the same
knowledge of this profession's standards as Crimmins was held to in the
securities industry. The CFTC has taken this matter further with the
enactment of regulation section 155.2 which calls for contract markets
to establish standards of conduct in regard to certain trading practices. 9
87 Id. at 277.
[1977-80 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,668, at 22,272.
89 17 C.F.R. S 155.2 (1982). Regulation 155.2 states that a contract market shall
adopt rules to:
(a) Prohibit such member from purchasing any commodity for future
delivery or any commodity option for his own account, or for any ac-
count in which he has an interest, while holding an order of another per-
son for the purchase of the same commodity or commodity option which
is executable at the market price or at the price at which such purchase
can be made for the member's own account or any account in which he
has an interest.
(b) Prohibit such member from selling any commodity for future
delivery or any commodity option for his own account, or for any ac-
count in which he has an interest, while holding an order of another per-
son for the sale of the same commodity or commodity option which is
executable at the market price or at the price at which such sale can
be made for the member's own account or any account in which he has
an interest.
(c) Prohibit such member from executing any transaction for any ac-
count of another person for which buying and/or selling orders can be
placed or originated, or for which transactions can be executed, by such
member without the prior specific consent of the account owner,
regardless of whether the general authorization for such orders or tran-
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Regulation section 8.12, entitled Right to Representation, is concerned
with the right to counsel." Regulation section 8.12 states that upon being
served with a notice of charges the respondent has the right to be
represented by counsel or any other representative of his choosing.9 This
section specifically omits counsel at the investigatory stages. The CFTC
sactions is pursuant to a written agreement, except that orders for such
an account may be placed with another member for execution.
(d) Prohibit such member from disclosing at any time that he is holding
an order of another person or from divulging any order revealed to him
by reason of his relationship to such other person, except pursuant to
paragraph (c) of this section or at the request of an authorized represen-
tative of the Commission or the contract market.
(e) Prohibit such member from taking, directly or indirectly, the other
side of any order of another person revealed to him by reason of his
relationship to such other person, except with such other person's prior
consent and in conformity with contract market rules approved by the
Commission.
(f) Prohibit such member from making any purchase or sale which
has been directly or indirectly prearranged.
(g) Prohibit such member from allocating trades among accounts ex-
cept in accordance with rules of the contract market which have been
approved by the Commission.
(h) Prohibit such member from withholding or withdrawing from the
market any order or part of an order of another person for the conve-
nience of another member.
(i) Require that every execution of a transaction on the floor by such
member be confirmed promptly with the opposite floor broker or floor
trader; such confirmation shall identify price, quantity, future and respec-
tive clearing members. In the event a contract market cannot require
prompt identification of respective clearing members without seriously
disrupting the functions of its marketplace, the contract market may peti-
tion the Commission for exemption from this requirement. Such petition
shall include:
(1) An explanation of why the contract market cannot require the
prompt identification of respective clearing members without seriously
disrupting the functions of its marketplace, and
(2) A proposed contract market rule which will insure that the op-
posite sides of every trade executed on the contract market can be ef-
fectively matched and will be accepted by a clearing member for clearance
or will be otherwise sufficiently guaranteed.
The Commission may, in its discretion and upon such terms and condi-
tions as it deems appropriate, grant such petition for exemption upon
finding that the functions of the contract market may be seriously
disrupted by requiring the prompt identification of respective clearing
members and that the contract market appears to have adequately in-
sured that every trade executed thereon can be effectively matched and
will be accepted by a clearing member for clearance or will be otherwise
sufficiently guaranteed.
Id.
, Id. S 8.12.
91 Id.
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remarked in the comments accompanying this regulation that there was
some merit in not providing a right to counsel during the investigatory
process because such representation could impede the progress of an in-
vestigation and result in more protracted and costlier proceedings.2
This position is not the best possible reasoning. It could put an in-
dividual's livelihood and exchange membership in jeopardy and deny him
an effective defense of that property right. The CFTC fails to note that
many of the exchanges provide in their rules that a member must
cooperate with any investigation through giving oral testimony or
documentary evidence upon the request of the exchange. 3 It is a condi-
tion of membership that a person agree to abide by the rules of the ex-
change, which call for cooperation in an investigation. Failure to cooperate
is a separate chargeable offense and will subject an exchange member
to punitive action. Surely the members' obligation to cooperate should
be enough to move an investigation forward. A better course for the CFTC
to have taken would have been that which was originally proposed:
representation by counsel at every stage of the disciplinary proceeding.
The CFTC did state that this regulation did not preclude an exchange
from providing a right to counsel at every stage of the disciplinary
process.' This particular comment is noteworthy for its lack of forcefulness
as compared to other CFTC comments.
A question may be raised as to why the right to counsel had to be
specified at all. A plausible explanation may be that the futures trading
industry has a long history of effective self-regulation with little or no
governmental oversight. 5 The industry has been accustomed to its own
methods, however peculiar they may appear to a prosecutor or defense
counsel. For example, the Chicago Board of Trade once had a rule which
stated that in hearings or investigations no person was entitled to
representation by professional counsel." With this type of rule in the in-
dustry's self-regulatory history it is understandable why an express
regulation granting the right to representation by counsel was adopted.
Regulation section 8.13, entitled Answer to Charges, provides that a
respondent be given a reasonable period of time to file an answer to the
charges. It does not make an answer mandatory but does permit an ex-
change to enact rules which establish procedures regarding a failure to
answer or to deny a specific charge. Exchanges are permitted to enact
[1977-80 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,668, at 22,729-30.
93 See COMMODITY EXCHANGE, INC. NEW RULES 8.02 (1980), MIDAMERICA COM-
MODITY EXCHANGE RULE 701(S) (1978), MINNEAPOLIS GRAIN EXCHANGE RULE 803
(1979), NEW YORK FUTURES EXCHANGE RULE 501(x) (1980), and NEW YORK MER-
CANTILE EXCHANGE RULE 59.04 (1980).
' [1977-80 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,668, at 22,730.
9' CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE MANUAL, 1, 15 (1980).
CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE RULE 160 (1969).
9' 17 C.F.R. S 8.13 (1982).
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rules which, in effect, state that a failure to answer will be deemed an
admission of the facts alleged. The regulation also requires that the answer
be in writing and "include a statement that the respondent admits, denies
or does not have and is unable to obtain sufficient information to admit
or deny each allegation. A statement of a lack of sufficient information
shall have the effect of a denial of an allegation.""8 The regulation further
states that a failure to file a timely answer is to be deemed an admission
of all charges in the complaint99 and, if an answer is made which fails
to deny a charge, such failure is deemed an admission of that charge.' 0
Thus, to protect the rights of a respondent, the best course is to make some
answer to the charge. In some instances a general denial will be appropriate.
It must be noted here that sections 8.13(a), (b) and (c) are prefaced by the
phrase, "the rules of an exchange may provide that .... ." 0 Therefore, it
would be well to note each particular contract market's rule concerning
answers.1
02
Regulation section 8.14, entitled Admission or Failure to Deny
Charges,103 is concerned with the effect an admission or a failure to deny
has on the respondent in a disciplinary proceeding. The regulation pro-
vides that exchange rules may state that if a respondent admits or fails
to deny charges against him, the disciplinary committee may find that
the rules which the complaint alleged to have been violated have in fact
been violated and may impose a penalty for each violation. Regulation
sections 8.13 and 8.14 taken together form the basis of any default pro-
cedure an exchange may institute.
Section 8.14 provides that where a default is taken the contract market
must notify the respondent promptly in writing of any action taken against
him and advise him that he may request a hearing on the penalty."4 This
hearing is not a matter of right. Section 8.14(b) states that "except for
good cause shown no hearing shall be permitted on a penalty imposed."'1
The default procedure provides that if a respondent fails to request a
hearing on the penalty within a reasonable time, he is deemed to have
accepted the penalty."0 In each instance a respondent must determine
" Id. 8.13(a).
" Id. § 8.13(b).
"o Id. § 8.13(c).
"' Id. § 8.13.
102 See the exchange rules relating to answers: CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE RULE
540.02 (1981), COMMODITY EXCHANGE, INC. RULE 8.35 OF THE NEW RULES OF COMEX
(1980), MINNEAPOLIS GRAIN EXCHANGE RULE 808 (1979), NEW YORK COFFEE, SUGAR
& COCOA EXCHANGE RULE 521 (1980), NEW YORK COTTON EXCHANGE RULE 10.09
(1981), NEW YORK FUTURES EXCHANGE, INC. RULE 505 (1980), and NEW YORK MER-
CANTILE EXCHANGE RULE 59.09 (1980).
1"3 17 C.F.R. S 8.14 (1982).
105 Id. 8.14(b).
105 Id.
"'6 Id. 8.14(c).
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whether defaulting on the merits and attempting to challenge a penalty
is a better strategy than standing up to a hearing on the merits. Counsel
of respondent would be well advised to check the time constraints of each
contract market as they regard as answer to charges, as they do differ.
Regulation section 8.15, entitled Denial of Charges and Right to
Hearing,' 7 sets forth a most basic aspect of due process, that of a hear-
ing on the merits. The charges to be heard may be all the charges or
just those denied in the respondent's answer. Discretion is granted the
exchange in enacting rules to determine which charges will be heard. This
section also provides for a hearing on the penalty. Regulation section 8.15
will be discussed further in conjunction with regulation section 8.17. '08
In the interim is regulation section 8.16, entitled Settlement Offer,"0 9
which was commented on extensively by the CFTC in its remarks upon
the adoption of Part 8. Regulation section 8.16 permits an exchange to
enact a rule allowing a respondent to submit a written offer of
settlement. ' This may be submitted at any time after the investigation
staff report is completed. The exchange may provide that respondent in
his offer of settlement accept a penalty without admitting or denying the
charges against him. The offer of settlement is an effective device for
successfully terminating disciplinary actions with a considerable saving
of time and costs to all parties. Regulation section 8.16 states that a writ-
ten decision accepting the offer of settlement must be made and shall
specify rule violations, any penalties imposed and whether the respon-
dent is admitting or denying the charges."' The regulation further
stipulates that if the offer is withdrawn or rejected, it is not to be con-
strued as an admission against the respondent."' In addition, the regula-
tion states that the respondent shall not in any way be prejudiced if an
offer he submits is withdrawn or rejected." 3 This permits a respondent
to negotiate an offer with the knowledge that he may still defend himself
to the fullest extent if the offer is rejected.
On the issue of penalties, the CFTC commentary noted the removal
from the proposed regulation of the requirement that any penalty imposed
be sufficient to deter future violations. However, the Commission did state
that an inadequate penalty would not be appropriate. The CFTC also stated
that in agreeing to the penalty provided in the settlement offer the
disciplinary committee must consider the same factors that it would use
in setting a penalty after a hearing."' There is no direction as to what
'o Id. S 8.15.
Id. S 8.17.
'o Id. 5 8.16.
110 Id.
1' Id.
'" Id. 5 8.16(d).
113 Id.
114 [1977-80 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,668, at 22,731.
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an appropriate penalty would be, nor is there any direction as to what
factors are to be considered prior to accepting a settlement. The CFTC
removal of the deterrent requirement appears to be merely cosmetic. Any
appropriate penalty should have a deterrent effect, no matter how
unstated such effect is by the CFTC.
It is important to note that even though an offer of settlement is made
which neither admits nor denies guilt, the acceptance of such an offer
does constitute a penalty, just as any action taken after a hearing which
finds guilt would also be a penalty. The simple difference is that there
is no finding of guilt or liability in an acceptance of an offer of settle-
ment. The importance of an accepted offer as a penalty is in the area
of registration with the Commission and with membership applications
to other exchanges. In both there is the requirement that the individual
state if he has ever been penalized by an exchange or by the CFTC or
another self-regulatory organization.115 This simple fact may work a deter-
rent effect on floor brokers or traders. It may also be one reason why
an individual will go to a hearing to attempt to exonerate himself com-
pletely rather than take the easy way out by offering to accept a penalty
to settle the case. Of course the decision of hearing or offer of settlement
should be made based upon the strength of the evidence presented against
the respondent and the validity of his defense.
As previously noted, regulation section 8.17 deals specifically with
hearings."' This regulation is concerned with providing a fair hearing,
a basic element of due process."7 It states that "the hearing shall be fair
and shall be conducted before members of the disciplinary committee.""8
In order to assure an unbiased hearing panel, the regulation states that
"no member of the disciplinary committee may serve on the committee
or panel if he or any person or firm with which he is affiliated has a finan-
cial, personal, or other direct interest in the matter under consideration."
The question of indirect interest must arise as a consequence of the use
of the word "direct." It must be determined at what point an indirect
interest becomes "direct."
The CFTC's commentary does not refer to any indirect interest and
merely states that the term "direct interest" took the place of the word
"disinterested" in the proposed rules. 2' Theoretically, on a panel of ex-
change members all would be interested in the case, if only as it reflects
upon the exchange as an entity, an entity in which they have a proprietary
interest. More specifically, indirect interest questions may have to do with
any common type of business done by the respondent and a member of
7 U.S.C. § 6-f(1) (Supp. V 1981).
116 17 C.F.R. S 8.17 (1982).
.., Id. S 8.17(a)(1).
118 Id.
119 Id.
"1 [1977-80 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,668, at 22,732.
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the panel, any business actually transacted between the respondent and
a panel member apart from the transaction in question, and any prior
relationship between a panel member and the respondent. A strong in-
direct interest would appear to be reasonable grounds upon which a
respondent could move for the panel member in question to disqualify
himself, or, failing to obtain a disqualification, for an appeal.
A simple fact should be noted here: exchanges are small communities.
It is in their nature that members know each other and do business with
each other. There is nearly no chance of getting a panel where the
members do not know the respondent at all. Perhaps by this regulation,
and by its commentary, the CFTC in its use of the term "indirect interest"
has taken note of the closeness of exchange communities and of what
may be an impossible task, that of being thoroughly disinterested.
The due process requirement of a fair hearing is advanced by regula-
tion section 8.17(a)(2), which is concerned with the respondent's discovery
rights. It states that:
The respondent shall be entitled in advance of the hearing to ex-
amine all books, documents, or other tangible evidence in the
possession or under the control of the exchange which are to be
relied upon by the enforcement staff in presenting the charges
contained in the notice of charges or which are relevant to these
charges."'
It should be noted that this does not provide a respondent with a right
to depose a member of the enforcement staff prior to a hearing even if
the case is based upon a personal observation, but it does make any rele-
vant notes, papers or recommendation of the enforcement staff subject
to discovery.
In regard to the possible use of interrogatories, the CFTC commented
that it did not believe their use necessary for a fair proceeding. The Com-
mission stated that "a respondent is adequately protected if he is entitled
to discover from the exchange all books, documents, or other tangible
evidence which are relevant to his case."1 " Given the nature of exchange
investigations, the type of violations pursued, and the excellent record
or audit trail which is required by regulation 1.35,13 this position by the
Commission is accurate. It does not result in a diminution of a respon-
dent's right to due process. Regulation section 8.17(a)(3) further advances
due process rights by providing that a hearing shall be held promptly
after reasonable notice to the respondent."2 ' Regulation section 8.17(a)(4)
121 17 C.F.R. S 8.17(a)(2) (1982).
" [1977-80 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,668, at 22,732.
2- 17 C.F.R. S 1.35 (1982).
124 Id. S 8.17(a)(3). See the following for the notice afforded respondents under
the rules of the various exchanges. CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE RULE 540.02 (1981),
COMMODITY EXCHANGE, INC. RULE 8.27 OF THE NEW RULES OF COMEX (1980),
MIDAMERICA COMMODITY EXCHANGE RULE 708 (1978), and NEW YORK FUTURES
EXCHANGE RULE 510 (1978).
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states that formal rules of evidence need not apply but cautions that
evidentiary procedures are not to be so informal as to deny a fair
hearing.'25 This regulation takes note of the fact that exchange disciplinary
proceedings are not held before lawyers in most instances. These panels
are most likely not schooled in the rules of evidence.
Regulation section 8.17(a)(5) provides that the enforcement staff of the
exchange shall present the case on the charges. 2 ' The enforcement staff
is therefore the investigator and the prosecutor.
Regulation section 8.17(a)(6)"' and (7)128 state, respectively, that the
respondent is entitled to appear personally at the hearing and shall be
entitled to cross examine any persons appearing as witnesses for the ex-
change. A respondent may call witnesses to testify in his behalf as pro-
vided by regulation section 8.17(a)(8)" These three subsections taken
together give strength to the basic protections of due process in an ex-
change disciplinary proceeding.
Regulation section 8.17(a)(9) empowers exchanges to "require persons
within its jurisdiction who are called on as witnesses to appear at the
hearing and to produce evidence. It shall make reasonable efforts to secure
the presence of all persons called as witnesses whose testimony would
be relevant. ' "3 The Commission, in its commentary, stated that this pro-
vision assures that a respondent will be able to call witnesses whose
testimony is material to his defense, and conversely enables the enforce-
ment staff, which lacks other than exchange subpoena power, to call hostile
witnesses who might otherwise be unwilling to testify.''
While this comment is admirable in what it hopes to accomplish, it is,
at the same time, somewhat unrealistic. The Commission fails to inform
an exchange how it is to get someone outside of its jurisdiction to ap-
pear, be sworn, give testimony, and be subject to the unpleasant ex-
perience of cross examination.
In addition, what constitutes a reasonable effort to secure witnesses
not subject to exchange jurisdiction? There is no hint as to what methods
are reasonable. Having embarked on such a regulation, it would have been
more appropriate to have given some guidance rather than a simple pro-
nouncement. Instead, the Commission goes on to comment on the type
and costs of a record of the hearing, leaving the question of witnesses
outside exchange jurisdiction unanswered. Fortunately, the realities of
exchange disciplinary proceedings are such that they usually involve per-
sons who are either members of the exchange or employees of such
'25 17 C.F.R. S 8.17(a)(4) (1982).
12 Id. § 8.17(a)(5).
12 Id. 8.17(a)(6).
'3'Id. 78.17(a)(7).
SId. §8.17(a)(8).
SId. §8.17(a)(9).
[1977-80 Transfer Binder] Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,668, at 22,733.
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members who are subject to jurisdiction through the employer-employee
relationship.
Regulation section 8.17(b) provides that an exchange may establish sum-
mary penalties to be imposed upon a person who fails to appear at a hear-
ing after proper notice or who, upon appearing, engages in conduct which
disrupts the proceeding.132 It is possible that contumacious testimony may
be included in this disruptive conduct.
Following the hearing, a decision must be rendered based upon the
evidence which was introduced at the hearing. Regulation section 8.18
sets forth what the decision shall include." It must be in writing and
include a notice of the charges or a summary thereof and contain the
respondent's answer and a summary of the evidence produced at the hear-
ing. The decision must also include a statement of the findings of the
hearing panel pertaining to each charge and refer to each rule found to
have been violated. Finally, the decision must state the penalty, if any,
and its effective date.3
The Commission commented that a written decision serves two func-
tions. First, it advises the respondent of the determination of the
disciplinary panel. Second, it provides a record for the Commission to
review pursuant to its oversight of exchange rule enforcement programs."
The Commission stated that for these purposes it was essential that the
decision be based upon the evidence introduced and include the reasons
for the decision. Decisions should not be made just to expedite the CFTC's
oversight activities but rather to inform a respondent why a finding has
been made in such a manner to enable the respondent to make an informed
determination whether he should accept the decision or appeal it to a
higher panel at the exchange or petition the CFTC for review. This
should be an integral part of due process in any disciplinary proceeding.
It appears that the CFTC has given weight to the respondent's right to
due process and to a means of facilitating its oversight obligation.
A respondent has a right to appeal a decision. Regulation section 8.19
permits an exchange to establish an appeal procedure.1 3 This procedure
must provide for a review board to hear appeals brought by respondents
and to review decisions on the board's initiative. As in the case of the
hearing panel, provision has been made to exclude any person from the
appeals panel who had any direct interest in the proceeding.1 3 1 In addi-
tion, no person involved in the case at any prior stage may hear an
appeal." As committee memberships in contract markets are changed
132 17 C.F.R. S 8.17(b) (1982).
1Id. 8.18.
i Id. §8.18(a)-(e).
13[ [1977-80 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,668, at 22,734.
l 17 C.F.R. S 8.19 (1982).
137 Id. S 8.19(b).
138 Id.
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on a regular basis it is useful to determine, prior to processing an appeal,
who has been named to sit on the appeal panel. A knowledge of the work-
ings of the investigation and enforcement staffs operations, together with
such knowledge of the accusatory panel and the hearing panel's opera-
tions and membership, is necessary to challenge successfully any panel
member's attendance on the appeal board. The appeal must consist of
a review of the hearing record together with written briefs submitted
by the parties and oral or written arguments." Thus, the appeals panel
cannot consider new evidence; instead, it is limited to the record evidence
produced at the hearing.
Following the hearing on the appeal, the board must issue a written
decision. It is inherent in a respondent's right to due process that he be
aware of the grounds for the decision and therefore, the decision is to
"include a statement of the findings and conclusions with respect to each
charge or penalty reviewed, including the specific rules which the respond-
ent was found to have violated by the disciplinary committee, and a
declaration of any penalty imposed and the effective date of such
penalty.""
To summarize Part 8, it is appropriate to state that due process is pres-
ent in all of its various sections. Throughout the regulations, the CFTC
was concerned with fundamental fairness which comprises due process.
The regulations have provided for notice to be given, a right to represen-
tation by counsel, an efficient evidentiary and adversarial procedure where
a respondent may confront and cross examine his accusers, and an im-
partial deliberative and appeals process. Since contract markets must meet
the requirements of Part 8 it is expected that, with subtle variations,
all contract markets will afford their members due process in disciplinary
proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
On May 3, 1982, the Supreme Court decided Curran v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc."' The Court answered the question of
whether there was a private right of action for violations of the Com-
modity Exchange Act by holding that there was an implied right of
action.' In Curran, the CFTC had argued that a private right of action
strengthens the enforcement and regulatory mechanisms already in
place.' The Court apparently found this to be a persuasive argument.
Whether a private right of action will have the desired effect remains
to be seen.
139 Id.
Id. S 8.19(c).
" 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980), affd, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
"4 456 U.S. at 382-88.
", Id. at 387.
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In the 1982 reauthorization of the CFTC, Congress amended' the CEA
to specifically include a private right of action. As it pertains to contract
markets the new statute provides:
(A) A contract market or clearing organization of a contract
market that fails to enforce any bylaw, rule, regulation, or resolu-
tion it is required to enforce by section 7a(8) and (9) of this title,
(B) a licensed board of trade that fails to enforce any bylaw, rule,
regulation or resolution that it is required to enforce by the Com-
mission, or (C) any contract market, clearing organization of a con-
tract market, or licensed board of trade that in enforcing any such
bylaw, rule, regulation or resolution violates this chapter or any
Commission rule, regulation, or order, shall be liable for actual
damages sustained by a person who engaged in any transaction
on or subject to the rules of such contract market or licensed board
of trade to the extent of such person's actual losses that resulted
from such transaction and were caused by such failure to enforce
or enforcement of such bylaws, rules, regulations, or resolutions.4 '
The amendment further provides that:
A person seeking to enforce liability under this section must
establish that the contract market, licensed board of trade, clear-
ing organization ... officer, director, governor, committee member,
or employee acted in bad faith in failing to take action or in tak-
ing such action as was taken, and that such failure or action caus-
ed the loss. 4 '
It is too early to determine what effect the amendments to the Act
will have on contract market self-regulation. In concluding this Article,
however, it is appropriate to note that regulation 1.35 among other record-
keeping requirements may have provided the source of evidence for
private actions under the Act.'47 It may be the realization by a contract
market that its own records and the specificity of them, as required by
the Act, may serve as the means to a successful lawsuit against it that
will be the moving factor in an enhancement of contract market self-
regulation.
... Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat.'2294, enacting
7 U.S.C.A. SS 2a, 12d, 25 and 26, amending 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 4a, 5, 6, 6a, 6c, 6d, 6f-i,
6k, 6m-p, 7a, 8, 9, 12, 12a, 13, 13a-1, 13a-2, 13c, 16a, 18, 20, 21, 23 and 612-3 (West
Supp. 1983).
7 U.S.C.A. S 25(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1983).
7 Id. S 25(b)(4).
117 17 C.F.R. § 1.35 (1982).
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